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Abortion and Conscientious Objection: Doogan – A Missed Opportunity for an Instructive Rights-
Based Analysis 
 
Abstract: Abortion is considered by some to be a morally questionable 
intervention, one which entitles the healthcarer to exercise conscientious objection 
so as to opt out of acting.  The healthcarer’s right to do so was recently considered 
by the UK Supreme Court in Greater Glasgow Health Board v Doogan & Wood, a 
case which set some boundaries on conscientious objection but which failed to 
engage holistically with the foundation of conscientious objection and its position 
relative to the competing right to adequate healthcare, a failure which must be 
seen as a lost opportunity given the manifold threats to timely access to abortion.  
This paper fills the lacunae.  After noting the weaknesses in the Doogan judgment, 
it justifies the adoption of a more robust approach by the UKSC, and then analyses 
the moral and rights foundations of abortion and conscientious objection, noticing 
as it does the growing practical problem that is the expansion and misuse of 
conscientious objection in women’s health (i.e., its deployment as a barrier to 
women seeking lawful abortion services).  It concludes that courts everywhere, but 
particularly in jurisdictions that are widely persuasive, such as the UK, when faced 
with the opportunity to pronounce on the right to abortion and the operation of 
conscientious objection, should take full advantage, and in doing so should adopt a 
critical and restrictive approach to its availability in the healthcare context. 
 
I. Introduction 
 
In a healthcare setting characterised by increasingly powerful interventions capable of both 
facilitating and interfering with the very early and very late stages of human life – stages that have 
traditionally been viewed as the bailiwick of Nature or God – a plurality of positions, and so some 
degree of moral conflict, is perhaps to be expected.  Like contraception, enforced sterilisation, 
medically assisted conception, withdrawal of care, and assisted suicide, abortion is one such 
intervention; it has implications for the continued development of embryos and foetuses (potential 
persons), for the health, wellbeing, access to safe and effective healthcare, and life possibilities of 
pregnant women (rights-bearing persons-in-being), and for the personal and professional position of 
healthcarers (moral agents in a unique calling), and it has been at the centre of political storms 
around the world for a long time. 
Historically, the combination of religious characterisations of abortion as sin, a (male) 
gendered approach to reproductive rights and entitlements, and ongoing efforts by empowered 
elites to preserve socio-political control over others caused abortion to be managed through the 
criminal law.  In the UK, abortion became a statutory crime under Lord Ellenborough’s Act 1803.1  It 
remained under the criminal law until the adoption of the Abortion Act 1967 (1967 Act),2 which 
made lawful the participation in abortion by certain individuals under certain conditions.  Another 
example is Canada, wherein the provision of information about, or the means of securing, 
contraception was characterised as a ‘crime against morality’ until 1969, and where abortion 
remained under the Criminal Code of Canada (CCC)3 until 1988.  So situated, the (medical) practice 
of surgically – and now medicinally – terminating unwanted pregnancies has suffered a long, loud, 
                                                          
1  43 Geo.III c. 58.  For more on the history of abortion and its regulation in the UK: S Gavigan, ‘The 
Criminal Sanction as it Relates to Human Reproduction: The Genesis of the Statutory Prohibition of Abortion’ 
(1984) 5 J Legal History 20-43; S Sheldon, Beyond Control: Medical Power and Abortion Control (Pluto Press, 
1997); S McGuinness and M Thomson, ‘Medicine and Abortion Law: Complicating the Reforming Profession’ 
(2015) 23 Med Law Rev 177-199. 
2  1967 c. 87.  The 1967 Act applies to England, Wales and Scotland, but not to Northern Ireland. 
3  RSC 1985, c. C-46. 
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vociferous, and lamentably violent history.4  And despite waves of modernisation in the governance 
of abortion, largely as a result of the slow recognition of human rights and of women’s reproductive 
rights, abortion remains within the ambit of the criminal law in many countries,5 many of which 
impose quite restrictive abortion practices.6 
In jurisdictions where abortion is authorised, healthcarers often have the potential to opt 
out of participating in treatment by raising a ‘conscientious objection’ (CO).  Such a right is contained 
in s 4(1) of the 1967 Act, which states that no person is under a duty to participate in any treatment 
authorised by the Act to which he has a CO, though it is the objector’s responsibility in any legal 
proceedings to prove the CO.7  CO was most recently considered in Greater Glasgow Health Board v 
Doogan & Wood (Doogan),8 wherein two Roman Catholic midwives who served as Labour Ward 
coordinators at the Southern General Hospital objected to taking part in any aspect of the 
intervention that resulted in the termination of a pregnancy because they believed, in keeping with 
current Church dogma, that life begins at conception.9  The case passed from the Outer House of the 
Court of Session, to the Inner House of the Court of Session, and then to the Supreme Court of the 
United Kingdom (UKSC), for which Lady Hale, for the Court, Lords Wilson, Reed, Hughes and Hodge 
concurring, stated that the only question before the Court was the meaning of the term ‘to 
participate in any treatment authorised by this Act’.10  She thus approached the case as a straight 
matter of statutory construction with some minimal reference to the social mischief that the 1967 
                                                          
4  Women in many jurisdictions have been harassed and intimidated upon entering abortion facilities, 
physicians have been threatened, assaulted, and murdered, and facilities have been burned and bombed, a  
campaign which has been particularly acute in North America: D Blanchard and T Prewitt, Religious Violence 
and Abortion (U Press Florida, 1993); E Schaff, ‘Redefining Violence against Women: The Campaign of Violence 
and the Delay of RU486’ (1999) 8 Temple Pol Civil Rights Law Rev 311-324; National Abortion Federation, 
Violence Statistics and History, at http://prochoice.org/education-and-advocacy/violence/violence-statistics-
and-history/ [accessed 29 April 2016].  And see the range of stories on The Huffington Post’s Anti Abortion 
Violence page, at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/news/anti-abortion-violence/ [accessed 29 April 2016].  In 
Canada, a substantial body of jurisprudence addresses the management of ‘zones of protection’ around 
abortion facilities: Ontario (AG) v Dieleman (1994) 117 DLR (4th) 449 (Ont SC); R v Watson and Spratt (2006) 70 
WCB (2d) 995 (BCCA); R v Spratt [2011] BCSC 1747; R v Von Dehn [2013] BCCA 187. 
5  R Cook and B Dickens, ‘Human Rights Dynamics of Abortion Law Reform’ (2003) 25 HR Quart. 1-59. 
6  Consider Ireland: R Fletcher, ‘Contesting the Cruel Treatment of Abortion-Seeking Women’ (2014) 22 
Repro Health Matters 10-21.  See WHO-Guttmacher Institute, Facts on Induced Abortion Worldwide (2012), at 
http://www.who.int/reproductivehealth/publications/unsafe_abortion/induced_abortion_2012.pdf?ua=1 
[accessed 15 August 2016], which reports that unsafe abortions are still common. 
7  Subsection 4(2) makes clear that a CO does not absolve the individual from participating in treatment 
which is necessary to save the life, or to prevent grave permanent injury to the physical or mental health, of a 
pregnant woman.  Subsection 4(3) states that, in Scotland, a statement under oath by the individual to the 
effect that he has a CO to participating in treatment authorised by the Act is sufficient to discharge the burden 
of proof. 
8  [2015] 1 AC 640 (UKSC), (2015) 142 BMLR 1 (UKSC). 
9  For centuries, the Catholic Church considered ensoulment to occur as a staged process, with 
‘personhood’ commencing at quickening – 40 to 90-days post-conception – but this was moved forward to 
conception in the early 1700s.  Though there was already a feast for Mary’s birthday, a celebration day was 
also sought for her date of conception by those advancing the dogma of Immaculate Conception.  Rather than 
choose the date of ensoulment supported by long-standing canon law (approximately six months pre-birth), 
Pope Clement XI, in 1708, chose December 8 (nine months pre-birth).  Then, in 1854, Pope Pius IX proclaimed 
the dogma of Immaculate Conception and thereby established the doctrine of immediate animation.  
Thereafter, in 1869, he removed from canon law the distinction between an ensouled and un-ensouled foetus.  
For more on this metaphysical discussion and the politics behind it: C Bouman, ‘The Immaculate Conception in 
the Liturgy’, in E O’Connor (ed.), The Dogma of the Immaculate Conception (U Notre Dame Press, 1958) 125-
126; T Engelhardt Jr., ‘The Ontology of Abortion’ (1974) 84 Ethics 217-234; J Mahoney, Bioethics and Belief 
(Sheed & Ward, 1984); R Gillon, ‘Is there a ‘new ethics of abortion’?’ (2001) 27 J Med Ethics ii5-ii9. 
10  Doogan, paras. 11 and 33. 
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Act was intended to remedy (i.e., unsafe ‘backstreet’ abortions).11 
Given the range of threats to women’s access to safe and timely reproductive healthcare, 
and to abortions specifically, both in the UK and elsewhere (despite the political battles that have 
won a legal foundation for abortion treatment12), and given the attempts, both in this case and 
beyond, to widen the scope and use of CO in the abortion setting, the UKSC might have taken this 
opportunity to explore more robustly the foundations of, and justifications for, abortion and CO, and 
the proper balance that ought to be struck by the medical profession in the use of the latter at the 
expense of the former.  Their Lordships had clearly been invited to do so, but Lady Hale 
characterised the invitation as a ‘distraction’.13  It is with this critically important ‘distraction’ that 
this paper engages.  First, it briefly reviews some of the most pertinent criticisms that have been 
levelled against Doogan, arguing that the UKSC should have adopted an approach which relied more 
directly on human rights and morality.  Second, it justifies this argument by considering the role and 
authority of the UKSC.  Third, it offers a more holistic social and legal analysis of abortion and CO; 
taking the baton that the UKSC might have run with, it examines the legal foundation of the right to 
an abortion, and its support from, and indeed grounding in, international human rights law; it then 
outlines the foundation and scope of CO, noting how it has become a tool in the ongoing battle to 
undermine access to abortion; it then grounds the limitation of CO in the professional duties of the 
healthcarer (i.e., physician, nurse, midwife).  Fourth, it offers an alternative approach to the scope of 
s 4(1).  It concludes that courts – particularly in jurisdictions that are widely persuasive, like the UK – 
when they are confronted with the opportunity to pronounce on important and controversial social 
and medical practices like CO within the healthcare context, should take full advantage. 
 
II. The Shortcomings of Doogan 
 
As noted, in Doogan, Lady Hale approached the question of the scope of s 4(1) as a matter of 
standard statutory construction, drawing to some extent on a speculative understanding of what 
was in the mind of the legislators when they enacted the provision almost 50 years ago.14  In doing 
so, she focused her attention on the meaning of ‘treatment’ and ‘to participate in’, as supported by 
the wording of the Act, noting in the process the position of the parties.15 
With respect to ‘treatment’, Lady Hale held that the 1967 Act took a process position (i.e., 
understood treatment as including the full course of activities that directly brought about the end of 
the pregnancy).16  With respect to ‘participation’, she identified a broad and a narrow reading; the 
broad reading encompassed both direct and indirect or hands-off involvement (i.e., taking calls, 
allocating staff, providing food, etc.), and the narrow reading comprised only hands-on involvement 
                                                          
11  Doogan, para. 27. 
12  On the changing nature of abortion politics: D McBride Stetson (ed.), Abortion Politics, Women’s 
Movements and the Democratic State (OUP, 2001); D Halfmann, Doctors and Demonstrators: How Political 
Institutions Shape Abortion Law in the United States, Britain and Canada (U Chicago Press, 2011), who notes 
how politicians in the UK have consistently shied away from engaging with anything to do with abortion.  
Indeed, the discussions around the adoption of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research Purposes) 
Regulations 2001/188 were circumscribed by a desire to avoid debates about abortion: S Parry, ‘The Politics of 
Cloning: Mapping the Rhetorical Convergence of Embryos and Stem Cells in Parliamentary Debates’ (2003) 22 
New Genetics & Society 177-200. 
13  Doogan, paras. 23-27. 
14  Doogan, para. 38.  But she failed to take notice of the complex and conflictual process by which the 
1967 Act was developed and adopted, and of the rivalries within the medical profession that informed its 
content: McGuinness and Thomson, note 1, who, after noting the precarious position of abortion services, 
characterise abortion as a contested boundary issue that helped to redefine the understanding of proper 
medical practice in a setting that was fraught with uncertainty. 
15  Doogan, paras. 33-36. 
16  Doogan, para. 33.  Approving of Royal College of Nursing of the UK v Department of Health and Social 
Security [1981] AC 800 (HL). 
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in the medical procedure itself.  She chose the latter in defining the scope of CO,17 stating: 
 
[T]he course of treatment to which the petitioners may object is the whole course 
of medical treatment bringing about the termination of the pregnancy.  It begins 
with the administration of the drugs designed to induce labour and normally ends 
with the ending of the pregnancy by delivery of the foetus, placenta and 
membrane.  It would also, in my view, include the medical and nursing care which is 
connected with the process of undergoing labour and giving birth – the monitoring 
of the progress of labour, the administration of pain relief, the giving of advice and 
support to the patient who is going through it all, the delivery of the foetus, which 
may require the assistance of forceps or an episiotomy, or in some cases an 
emergency Caesarian section, and the disposal of the foetus, placenta and 
membrane.  In some cases, there may be specific aftercare which is required as a 
result of the process of giving birth, such as the repair of an episiotomy.18 
 
She held that the right to CO does not extend to things done before the course of treatment begins, 
such as making the booking before the first drug is administered, or to other managerial or 
administrative things done in connection with the treatment, such as assigning, supervising, or 
supporting staff, or monitoring patients in the ward afterwards.19  And she held that it does not 
permit physicians to avoid referring patients to a colleague who does not hold any objections.20 
Doogan has already been subject to an incisive and compelling critique which demonstrates 
the uncertainty associated with the UKSC’s analytical foundation, and so the weaknesses in its 
analysis and conclusions.21  In that critique, Neal observes that the mischief which the 1967 Act was 
meant to alleviate was actually a lack of legal clarity around the position of abortions and when they 
might by lawfully conducted, an ambiguity highlighted by the very different positions that the parties 
to the litigation adopted with respect to the term treatment.  She argues that the UKSC, in 
determining the scope of s 4(1), therefore appears to rely on an understanding of what was 
previously criminal, a faulty approach that led to a number of unfounded conclusions.22  In the 
course of her critique, Neal observes that the 1967 Act both decriminalised and medicalised 
abortion, shifting it to an NHS setting.  In doing so, it established abortion as a treatment process in 
which a team of healthcarers in a structured and accountable clinical context are active in service 
delivery.  As such, a wider understanding of both ‘treatment’ and ‘participation’ was warranted.23  
She continues as follows: 
 
[A]pproaching the scope of a conscience-based exemption by acknowledging the 
nature and purpose of such provisions must be preferable to approaching it in a 
way that ignores them; and when the issue is viewed through the lens of moral 
responsibility, it is immediately apparent that someone who authorises a process 
(for example, the general practitioner who signs the form) has moral responsibility 
for it, as do those who support the process by arranging practicalities, allocating 
                                                          
17  Doogan, paras. 34-38.  Reaffirming Janaway v Salford Area General Authority [1989] AC 537 (HL). 
18  Doogan, para. 34. 
19  Doogan, paras. 37-38. 
20  Doogan, para. 40. 
21  M Neal, ‘When Conscience Isn’t Clear: Greater Glasgow Health Board v Doogan and Another [2014] 
UKSC 68’ (2015) 23 Med Law Rev 1-15. 
22  Ibid, at 9. 
23  Ibid, at 10 and 11.  For more on the process and machinery associated with abortion services in the 
UK, see J Montgomery, ‘Conscientious Objection: Personal and Professional Ethics in the Public Square’ (2015) 
23 Med Law Rev 200-220, at 202-203. 
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tasks, and supervising those directly involved.24 
 
In short, the uncertainty that suffused the practice setting at the time of adoption (which 
undermines the utility of references to prior practice and legislative intent), combined with the 
unclear and apparently alternating foundation of the UKSC’s analysis, led the UKSC to interpret the 
scope of CO in an impoverished manner.  It should have understood that the treatment process 
begins before the labour-inducing administration of drugs, and that it includes the support given in 
recovery.  Thus, many more individuals ‘participate’ in abortion ‘treatment’ than allowed for by the 
UKSC. 
 
III. The Road Not Taken in Doogan 
 
The UKSC was invited to consider the dispute from a rights perspective, and to interpret the 
contested provision with reference to Article 9 (freedom of religion) of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (1950) (ECHR).25  Lady Hale stated that there had been discussion in the proceedings 
about the relevance of such rights,26 but she declined to consider the rights and obligations of the 
parties with reference to the ECHR, or to apply a rights-informed analysis of the provision.  
Characterising a rights approach as a ‘distraction’, she stated that a consideration of Article 9 would 
not be helpful because it is a qualified right subject to limitations that would implicate employer 
restrictions that would themselves be context-specific, and so any answers arrived at would point 
neither to a wide nor a narrow reading of the right to CO within the 1967 Act.27  She also suggested 
that the UKSC was not equipped to ‘speculate’ on the broader consequences of enunciating a wide 
or narrow meaning of s 4(1), saying that it did not have the evidence by which to resolve the 
competing claims being made in relation thereto.28 
In essence, Lady Hale side-lined the obvious and important moral and human rights aspects 
of the case and thereby denied the parties, the implicated health services, the public, and indeed the 
participants in international and domestic abortion politics, a usefully contextual and rights-
informed interpretation of an important and precarious piece of health legislation and a right 
enunciated therein.  Neal observes that the UKSC should have taken much more seriously its task of 
articulating and justifying the scope of s 4(1), bearing in mind the moral character of the right and 
the broader responsibilities of healthcarers.29  I concur.  But Lady Hale declined to take up the role 
that we might reasonably expect of her as a member of a country’s highest and unifying court. 
On the matter of role, one might note that Doogan was an appeal from Scotland, for which 
the UKSC is the final civil court of appeal.30  Civil appeals may involve constitutional, public 
administration, or human rights issues (i.e., the UKSC has jurisdiction to hear cases relating to the 
common law or statutory law, including issues implicating the Human Rights Act 1998 (1998 
Act),31and the Scotland Act 1998 (SCA 1998)32).33  The UKSC is also the final court of appeal for 
                                                          
24  Neal, ibid, at 12, where she uses an example of the processing of Jews at Auschwitz during the Nazi 
regime in Germany. 
25  ETS 005, Rome, in force 3 September 1953. 
26  Doogan, para. 23. 
27  Doogan, para. 23. 
28  Doogan, paras. 25-27. 
29  She suggests that the UKSC could have but failed to ‘add value’ to the lower court’s decision: Neal, 
note 21, at 15. 
30  See s 40, Court of Session Act 1988, as amended by the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, and UKSC, 
Supreme Court Practice Direction 4: Notice of Appeal (2015), at para. 4.2.2. 
31  1998, c. 42. 
32  1998, c. 46. 
33  UKSC, The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom in Scottish Appeals: Human Rights, 
the Scotland Act 2012 and the Courts Reform (Scotland) Act 2014 (2015), at 1. 
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purposes of considering the ECHR, and so for appealing cases to the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR).  Though the UKSC cannot raise issues under the ECHR,34 s 3(1) of the 1998 Act 
obligates the UKSC to interpret legislation in a manner compatible with the 1998 Act (and the 
ECHR).35  So rights should be directly engaged with when they are implicated, as they were in 
Doogan.  A further argument for a more robust and rights-sensitive approach can be found in the 
stated expectation that the impact of the UKSC’s decisions will extend far beyond the parties 
involved in any given case; they are expected to shape society more broadly,36 and so of course 
would need to acknowledge the social context in which the decision operates. 
On the latter point, Aharon Barak, President of the Supreme Court of Israel, states that the 
primary concern of a supreme court in a democracy is not to correct individual mistakes in lower 
court judgments, but rather to concern itself with broader, system-wide corrective action, which 
corrective action should focus on two main issues: bridging the gap between law and society; and 
protecting democracy.37  On the matter of bridging the gap, Barak has elaborated as follows: 
 
The law regulates relationships between people.  It prescribes patterns of behavior.  
It reflects the values of society.  The role of the judge is to understand the purpose 
of law in society and to help the law achieve its purpose.  But the law of a society is 
a living organism.  It is based on a given factual and social reality that is constantly 
changing.  Sometimes the change is drastic, sudden, and easily identifiable.  
Sometimes [it] is minor and gradual, and cannot be noticed without the proper 
distance and perspective.  Law’s connection to this fluid reality implies that it too is 
always changing.  Sometimes change in law precedes societal change and is even 
intended to stimulate it.  In most cases, however, a change in law is the result of a 
change in social reality.  Indeed, when social reality changes, the law must change 
too.  Just as change in social reality is the law of life, responsiveness to change in 
social reality is the life of the law.  It can be said that the history of law is the history 
of adapting the law to society's changing needs.  A thousand years of common law 
are a thousand years of changes in the law in order to adapt it to the needs of a 
changing reality.  The judge is the primary actor in effecting this change.38 
 
In short, it is incumbent on courts like the UKSC to place their decisions in the broader social context, 
and to be aware of that context and its needs when formulating their judgments.  In doing so, courts 
must be particularly aware of human rights and the limits placed on them, always striving to 
determine and protect the integrity of the balance between them.39 
                                                          
34  Ibid, at 3. 
35  UKSC, The Supreme Court and Europe, at https://www.supremecourt.uk/about/the-supreme-court-
and-europe.html [accessed 15 August 2016]. 
36  UKSC, Significance to the UK, at https://www.supremecourt.uk/about/significance-to-the-uk.html 
[accessed 15 August 2016].  It has been argued that the judicial reforms which led to the creation of the UKSC 
was a conscious push toward greater judicial independence and incursion into legislative and policy matters: M 
Fennell, ‘Emergent Identity: A Comparative Analysis of the New Supreme Court of the United Kingdom and the 
Supreme Court of the United States’ (2008) 22 Temple Int & Comp LJ 279-306. 
37  A Barak, ‘A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy’ (2002-2003) 119 Harvard 
Law Rev 19-162, at 27-28, citing B Laskin, ‘The Role and Functions of Final Appellate Courts: The Supreme 
Court of Canada’ (1975) 53 Can Bar Rev 469, and W Rehnquist, ‘The Changing Role of the Supreme Court’ 
(1986) 14 FSU Law Rev 1-14 
38  Ibid, at 28-29, citing B Cardozo, The Paradoxes of Legal Science (Greenwood Press, 1970), J Stone, 
Legal System and Lawyers’ Reasoning (Stanford U Press, 1968), and B Dickson, ‘A Life in the Law: The Process 
of Judging’ (2000) 63 Sask Law Rev 373-388. 
39  Ibid, at 44.  The adoption of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, which created the UKSC, led to much 
debate about the future position of Parliamentary Sovereignty and judicial review in the (new) British 
constitutional order, with some seeing it as a step toward greater judicial independence, EU integration, and 
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The above suggests that the UKSC had the authority – indeed the responsibility – to bring 
the relevant human rights to bear when interpreting this contested statutory provision.  Moreover, 
when adjudging the provision, it need not have felt constrained from placing both the case and the 
provision in their broader social contexts; it is empowered and expected to contextualise the case 
before it and to offer an interpretation that serves society as well as the parties.  In Doogan, the 
UKSC was asked to interpret a statutory right that has obvious human rights foundations, and that 
affects a persistently contested but lawful medical procedure that also has clear human rights 
implications.  The UKSC therefore might have begun its substantive judgment by placing the 
treatment at issue (abortion), the contested practice (CO), and the roles of healthcarers in their 
broader moral, social and rights context, and from there reasoned its way to an appropriate scope 
for s 4(1) that made sense in the 21st century.  Had it done so, the UKSC would have rendered a 
judgment that was richer, more satisfying, and more useful in light of the potentially wide availability 
and increasing use of CO.40  Its narrow interpretive approach must be viewed as an inappropriately 
spurned opportunity to reaffirm abortion and to articulate the right to CO relative thereto, making 
clear that its understanding of CO may well have relevance in other healthcare contexts. 
 
IV. An Alternative and Better (?) Approach 
 
Lady Hale stated at the outset that the case was about the precise scope of the right of CO.41  
Obviously, an interpretation of the provision which grants the right is necessitated.  However, rather 
than acknowledge the need to interpret the provision in a way compatible with ECHR rights but then 
decline to do so because the exercise of the CO would be undertaken in employment settings that 
would each have unique circumstances,42 Lady Hale might have highlighted that what was at issue in 
this case was both access to, and participation in, a contested but lawful (and indeed critical) 
medical treatment; that an interpretation of s 4(1) necessarily implicated, and so must be informed 
by, a woman’s right to reasonable reproductive health, choice and healthcare, and by a healthcarer’s 
potentially countervailing right to exercise personal moral choice in a professional context that has 
special moral and ethical features and imposes special and sometimes onerous and unwelcome 
obligations.  The following is an analysis akin to that which might have been undertaken by the 
UKSC; it is a moral and human rights-based justification of access to abortion, and a rights-based 
consideration of CO and its position in the caring context having reference to an ethics-conscious 
elucidation of the healthcarer’s responsibilities. 
 
A. The Right to Reproductive Health and Access to Abortion 
 
It is axiomatic that all individuals have moral and legal claims to reasonable healthcare as a function 
of their being human.  Indeed, it has been observed that the wellbeing, productivity, and vibrancy of 
individuals, communities, and societies is linked directly to individual and community health, a fact 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
more robust review.  Regardless of where individuals stand on this debate, it is generally agreed that the 
power of the Court to review legislative provisions and actions that are within the scope of the 1998 Act is 
clearly established: M Skold, ‘Reform Act’s Supreme Court: A Missed Opportunity for Judicial Review in the 
United Kingdom?’ (2007) 39 Conn Law Rev 2149-2182. 
40  I am not here suggesting that the UKSC should have undertaken a review of the ‘constitutionality’ of 
the provision in relation to its compatibility with the implicated human rights.  Rather, I am suggesting that the 
UKSC should have formulated its understanding of the subject provision (and right) having regard to the 
human rights implicated.  As such, I take no position on the ongoing debate about the constitutional role of the 
UKSC with respect to Parliamentary Sovereignty and the striking down of legislative provisions. 
41  Doogan, para. 1. 
42  Which is what Lady Hale did in Doogan, para. 23. 
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which gives healthcare a special (moral) character.43  And such is recognised and fully endorsed by 
the international human rights framework to which the UK has subscribed through its adoption of 
the Human Rights Act 1998 and its ratification of human rights conventions. 
For example, the Preamble of the WHO Constitution (1946)44 recognises that the enjoyment 
of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being.  
Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) (UDHR)45 states that everyone has the 
right to a standard of living adequate for their health and wellbeing, including medical care.  Article 
12(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) (ICESCR),46 states 
that everyone has the right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and 
mental health.  Other instruments that acknowledge the right to healthcare include the African 
Charter on Human and People’s Rights (1982),47 the Additional Protocol to the American Convention 
on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1988),48 the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (1989),49 the European Social Charter 1996 (Revised),50 and the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (1997).51  It has also been reported that the right is 
enshrined in over 100 constitutional provisions around the world.52  And the right has given rise to, 
and been vindicated in, important jurisprudence.53  Ultimately, the right to reasonable healthcare 
without discrimination has been widely (and rightly) accepted as a juridical right (as opposed to a 
socio-political aspiration), although the practical contours and limitations of the right are subject to 
multiple social and economic factors. 
A second socio-moral truth is that women deserve special attention and protection as a 
result of their special physiological role as child-bearers.  In this regard, it must be recognised that 
reproduction is ‘transformative’ for women; it impacts on physical wellbeing, individual and family 
priorities and aspirations, identity, and financial security.54  For example, pregnancy causes massive 
physical changes (e.g., uterus expansion, organ displacement, hormonal surges, weight gain, nausea, 
pain), has common complications (e.g., profound nausea, pre-eclampsia, gestational diabetes, 
obstetric fistula), and permanent side-effects (e.g., pelvic floor disorders, periodic urinary 
incontinence, etc.).  Educational possibilities can be delayed or lost, especially for single mothers, 
                                                          
43  L Gostin, ‘Securing Health or Just Health Care? The Effect of the Health Care System on the Health of 
America’ (1994) 39 St Louis ULJ 7-44; M Low, B Low et al., ‘Can Education Policy Be Health Policy? Implications 
of Research on the Social Determinants of Health’ (2005) 30 J Health Pol, Policy & Law 1131-1162. 
44  Adopted by the International Health Conference, New York, 19 June to 22 July 1946, signed on 22 July 
1946, in force on 7 April 1948.  Present version in WHO, Basic Documents, 45th ed., Supplement (WHO, 2006). 
45  UNGA Res 217 A (III), 10 December 1948. 
46  UNGA Res 2200A (XXI), 16 December 1966, in force on 3 January 1976. 
47  OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58, 27 June 1981, in force 21 October 1986, Article 16. 
48  TS No. 69, San Salvador, 17 November 1988, in force 16 November 1999, Article 10. 
49  UNGA Res 44/25, 20 November 1989, in force 2 September 1990, Article 24. 
50  ETS No. 163, Strasbourg, in force 1 July 1999, Article 11. 
51  ETS No. 164, Ovieda, 4.IV.1997, in force 1 December 1999, Article 3.  Though the UK has not ratified 
this convention. 
52  P Hunt, UN Special Rapporteur, ‘The Human Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health: New 
Opportunities and Challenges’ (2006) 100 Trans Royal Society Tropical Med & Hygiene 603-607. 
53  See Vo v France [2004] 2 FCR 577, wherein the ECtHR held that the status and dignity of the living 
individual properly outweighs that of the foetus, which means that it has no status in law to override or 
infringe upon the pregnant woman’s liberty to make decisions for herself.  See Artavia Murillo v Costa Rica 
(2012) Inter-American Court (Ser. C) No. 257, wherein the IACHR held that the American Convention on 
Human Rights (1969) protects individuals’ rights to reproductive autonomy, and imposed on Member States 
an obligation to regulate and oversee the provision of health services to ensure effective protection of the 
rights to life and personal integrity of women.  See also Mondoza et al. v Ecuador (Ministry of Public Health) et 
al., Resolucion No. 0749-2003-RA, 28 January 2004. 
54  L Finer, L Frohwirth, et al., ‘Reasons US Women Have Abortions: Quantitative and Qualitative 
Perspectives’ (2005) 37 Persp on Sexual Repro Health 110-118. 
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and securing employment can be more complicated before and during pregnancy, and difficult to 
retain after pregnancy.  Finally, there are manifold social and emotional consequences.  All of this 
points to the fact that a woman’s dignity and individual flourishing is directly and profoundly 
influenced (and potentially undermined) by reproduction, with the consequence that her choices 
associated with reproduction must be facilitated as a matter of moral correctness. 
Unfortunately, women’s health has long and persistently (and to devastating effect) been 
marginalised,55 and the right to terminate an unwanted pregnancy has long and widely been 
considered a crime (and is still so considered in some countries).56  Through persistent social, 
political and legal action, and facilitated by feminism, the social movements of the 1960s, and the 
growing power of the human rights paradigm, laws against abortion have slowly and unevenly been 
liberalised.57  This process, together with the physiological and social consequences of pregnancy 
noted above, has made clear that access to abortion treatment is rightly characterised as a moral 
entitlement.58  And the long-standing and universally held socio-moral values of human dignity, 
equality (or equity), and autonomy, are obviously engaged (to the benefit of the woman) in the 
reproduction context. 
Given the above, Article 25 UDHR stipulates that motherhood and childhood are entitled to 
special care and assistance.  Article 10(2) ICESCR states that special protection should be accorded to 
mothers during a reasonable period before and after childbirth.  Article 12 of the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979) (Women’s Convention),59 which 
condemns all discrimination against women and which characterises the refusal of medical 
procedures that only women require as sexual discrimination, states: 
 
1.  States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate 
discrimination against women in the field of health care in order to ensure, on a 
basis of equality of men and women, access to health care services, including those 
related to family planning.  
 
2.  … States Parties shall ensure to women appropriate services in connection 
with pregnancy, confinement and the post-natal period, granting free services 
where necessary … 
 
In a similar vein, the 1994 Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and 
Development (ICPD) explicitly recognised that reproductive rights are human rights: 
 
Reproductive rights embrace certain human rights that are already recognised in 
national laws, international human rights documents and other relevant UN 
consensus documents.  These rights rest on the recognition of the basic right of all 
couples and individuals to decide freely and responsibly the number, spacing and 
timing of their children and to have the information and means to do so, and the 
right to attain the highest standard of sexual and reproductive health.  It also 
                                                          
55  UN Economic and social Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur: The Right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health (2004), E/CN.4/2004/49. 
56  The devastating impact that the criminalisation of abortion and the practices of CO have had on 
women has been observed: UN Special Rapporteur, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone 
to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health: Interim Report, A/66/254 
(2011). 
57  Halfmann, note 12; R Boland and L Katzive, ‘Developments in Laws on Induced Abortion: 1998-2007’ 
(2008) 34 Int Family Plann Perspect 110-120. 
58  Though it has been claimed that there are difficulties in mounting a moral defence of abortion: C 
McLeod, ‘Referral in the Wake of Conscientious Objection’ (2008) 23 Hypatia 30-47. 
59  UNGA Res 34/180, UN GAOR 34th Sess., Supp No 44, at 193, in force on 3 September 1981. 
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includes the right to make decisions regarding reproduction free of discrimination, 
coercion and violence …60 
 
The conviction that reproductive health is an integral component of health, and that it is a human 
right, was accepted at the Fourth World Conference on Women (1995),61 and at subsequent 
conferences in 1999,62 and 2000.63  The international Inter-Agency Safe Motherhood Initiative, 
advanced in partnership with the WHO, UNICEF, and others, has also underlined the social burden 
and injustice of preventable maternal mortality.64  In recognition of this, the Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Council of Europe (PACE) adopted Resolution 1607 (2008),65 which invites Member States to: 
 
 decriminalise abortion within reasonable gestational limits, guarantee women’s effective 
exercise of their right of access to a safe and legal abortion; 
 
 allow women freedom of choice and offer the conditions for a free and enlightened choice; 
 
 lift restrictions which hinder access to safe abortion, which includes taking practical and 
financial steps to create conditions for health, medical and psychological care in relation to 
abortion. 
 
All told, a right to reproductive health (and healthcare) has a strong and explicit foundation in key 
human rights instruments, and where reproductive health – which obviously encompasses safe and 
effective termination of an unwanted pregnancy – is not explicitly identified, it nonetheless ‘lives’ 
within the widely enumerated rights to personal security and liberty.  In that regard, the Canadian 
abortion case, R v Morgentaler,66 is an important benchmark.  In Morgentaler, s 251 CCC67 was 
                                                          
60  UN, Programme of Action (1994), International Conference on Population and Development, Cairo, 5-
13 September 1994, UN Doc. A/CONF171/13/Rev 1 (1995), at 7.3; now published as UN, Programme of Action 
(2014). 
61  UN, Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (1995), Fourth World Conference on Women: Action 
for Equality, Development and Peace, Beijing, UN Doc A/CONF. 177/20. 
62  UN, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Whole of the 21st Special Session of the General Assembly: 
Overall Review and Appraisal of the Implementation of the Programme for Action of the ICPD (1999), UN Doc 
A/S-21/5/Add.1. 
63  UN, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Whole of the 23rd Special Session of the General 
Assembly: Further Actions and Initiatives to Implement the Beijing Declaration and the Platform for Action 
(2000), UN Doc A/S-23/10/Rev.1. 
64  More on which can be found at www.who.int/en/. 
65  PACE, Resolution 1607 (2008): Access to Safe and Legal Abortion in Europe, 15th Sitting of the 
Assembly, 16 April 2008. 
66  [1988] 1 SCR 30.  Obviously, one of the early and most important judicial considerations of the right to 
an abortion (as a constituent component of reproductive health) is Roe v Wade (1973) 410 US 113 (USSC), 
which has been reaffirmed, albeit narrowly, in City of Akron v Akron Center for Reproductive Health Inc. (1983) 
462 US 416 (USSC), Thornburgh v American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (1986) 106 S Ct 2169, 
Webster v Reproductive Health Services (1989) 109 S Ct 3040, and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v Casey (1992) 112 S Ct 2791, although more and more restrictions on access have been 
permitted.  However, Roe v Wade reflects the USA’s unique constitutional and political character.  For 
background on the political significance of Roe v Wade, see L Greenhouse and R Siegel, ‘Before (and After) Roe 
v. Wade: New Questions About Backlash’ (2011) 120 Yale LJ 2028-2087.  For more on abortion in the USA, see 
B Alvarez Manninen, ‘Rethinking Roe v. Wade: Defending the Abortion Right in the Face of Contemporary 
Opposition’ (2010) 10 Am J Bioethics 33-46. 
67  Subsections 251(1) and (2) created an offence for any person to use any means to procure a 
miscarriage for a woman, and for any woman to use any means to procure her own miscarriage.  Subsection 
251(3) defined ‘means’ as the administration of a drug or other noxious thing, the use of an instrument, and 
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challenged as infringing security of the person under s 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms (Charter),68 which section reflects Article 5 ECHR.  On the facts, which included evidence 
relating to the terrible difficulty encountered by women trying to meet the s 251(4) conditions, a 
majority of the Supreme Court held that women were exposed to a threat to their physical and 
psychological security, and that s 251 could not be saved under the limiting provision of s 1 of the 
Charter.69  In the result, reliance on therapeutic panels (which is a feature of the conditions for 
securing a lawful abortion under s 1(1) of the 1967 Act) was struck down as unconstitutional.70 
Morgentaler is noteworthy not only for the grounding of access to abortion on international 
human rights-informed Charter rights, but also for some of the broader observations offered.  For 
example, Dickson CJC, in finding a Charter breach, stated: 
 
Forcing a woman, by threat of criminal sanction, to carry a foetus to term unless 
she meets certain criteria unrelated to her own priorities and aspirations, is a 
profound interference with a woman’s body and thus a violation of security of the 
person.71 
 
In her concurring judgment, the redoubtable Wilson J observed that, in addition to security, s 7 
speaks to liberty.  As such, individuals have guaranteed to them a degree of autonomy in making 
decisions of fundamental personal importance; they have the right to develop and realise their 
potential to the fullest, to plan their own life to suit their own character, and to make their own 
choices so long as one does not attempt to deprive others of their liberty in the process.  On the 
special significance of abortion to women, Wilson J stated: 
 
It is probably impossible for a man to respond, even imaginatively, to such a 
dilemma not just because it is outside the realm of his personal experience 
(although this is, of course, the case) but because he can relate to it only by 
objectifying it, thereby eliminating the subjective elements of the female psyche 
which are at the heart of the dilemma. … [T]the history of the struggle for human 
rights from the eighteenth century on has been the history of men struggling to 
assert their dignity and common humanity against an overbearing state apparatus. 
The more recent struggle for women’s rights has been a struggle to eliminate 
discrimination, to achieve a place for women in a man’s world, to develop a set of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
manipulation of any kind.  Subsection 251(4) enunciated the conditions under which an abortion was lawful, 
namely when a 3-member therapeutic abortion committee of an accredited hospital considered the case and 
issued a certificate stating that the continuation of the pregnancy would likely endanger the pregnant 
woman’s life or health, and the certificate was received by a separate medical practitioner who was then 
permitted to perform an abortion. 
68  Section 7 states: “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to 
be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”  
69  Section 1 states: “The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms 
set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free 
and democratic society.” 
70  But wide discrepancies in the availability of, and the conditions for, abortion services remain.  On 
providers: Quebec is the best, with 31 of 129 hospitals plus 36 clinics offering abortions; in British Columbia, 26 
of 90 hospitals plus 6 clinics; in Ontario, 33 of 194 hospitals plus 11 clinics; in Nova Scotia, only 4 of 30 
hospitals and 0 clinics; in Prince Edward Island, no service is provided.  On conditions: Quebec, Ontario and BC 
all allow for self-referral (i.e., access without referral from a GP or physician), and make treatment available up 
to 23, 24 and 20 weeks of gestation respectively.  Nova Scotia does not allow self-referral, and it imposes a 
gestational limit of 15 weeks (with no medicinal abortions).  New Brunswick, the Yukon and Nunavut impose 
gestational limits of 12 weeks. M Reid, ‘Access by Province’ at http://www.morgentaler25years.ca/the-
struggle-for-abortion-rights/access-by-province/ [accessed 29 April 2016]. 
71  Morgentaler, at 32-33. 
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legislative reforms in order to place women in the same position as men … It has 
not been a struggle to define the rights of women in relation to their special place 
in the societal structure and in relation to the biological distinction between the 
two sexes.  Thus, women’s needs and aspirations are only now being translated into 
protected rights.  The right to reproduce or not to reproduce which is in issue in this 
case is one such right and is properly perceived as an integral part of modern 
woman’s struggle to assert her dignity and worth as a human being.72 
 
On the matter of access to abortion treatment, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, tasked with monitoring the ICESCR, has issued General Comment 14,73 which explains, at 
para. 12, that the right to healthcare requires compliance with certain performance standards: 
 
 availability (services must be available in sufficient quantity); 
 
 accessibility (services, including information, must be physically and economically accessible 
to everyone without discrimination); 
 
 acceptability (services must be culturally appropriate and sensitive to gender and life-cycle 
requirements); and 
 
 adequacy (services must be scientifically appropriate and of sufficient quality). 
 
Several important moral and legal propositions are supported.  First, equitable access to adequate 
healthcare is a universally accepted human right, and that right includes a right to reproductive 
healthcare.  Second, women’s health, which has long been marginalised as a result of sexual, gender 
and reproductive discrimination, has special status and demands special protection.  Third, abortion, 
as a critical element of reproductive healthcare, is morally justified as a condition of respecting 
women’s dignity, autonomy, equality, and citizenship (women should not be forced to incubate and 
feed another against their will).74  Fourth, conscious political and legal efforts have been undertaken 
to legalise abortion, and to include it in the public health system; this has sometimes been done 
explicitly and positively, and sometimes less positively. 
For an example, note South Africa’s Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 1997, which 
explicitly states in para. 4 of the Preamble that the decision to have children is fundamental to a 
woman’s physical, psychological, and social health, and that universal access to reproductive 
healthcare includes access to family planning and contraception, termination of pregnancy, and 
sexual education and counselling.  For a negative approach, we have the 1967 Act, which, without 
explicitly placing abortion in the broader treatment setting, makes abortion ‘lawful’ in certain 
circumstances; s 1(1) states that a person shall not be guilty of an offence when a pregnancy is 
terminated by a registered medical practitioner so long as two registered medical practitioners are 
of the opinion, formed in good faith, that: 
 
a. the pregnancy has not exceeded its 24th week and its continuance would involve greater 
risk of injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman or any existing children 
of her family than its terminated; or 
 
b. the termination is necessary to prevent grave permanent injury to the physical or mental 
                                                          
72  Morgentaler, at 171-172. 
73  Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 14 on the Right to Health 
(2000), UN CEDSCR 22nd Sess. UN Doc E/C.12/2000/4. 
74  A point made forcefully in R Cook and B Dickens, note 5. 
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health of the pregnant woman; or 
 
c. the continuance of the pregnancy would involve greater risk to the life of the pregnant 
woman than if it were terminated; or 
 
d. there is a substantial risk that the child, if born, would suffer from such physical or mental 
abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped. 
 
In forming their opinion, the medical practitioners are permitted to take into account the pregnant 
woman’s actual or reasonably foreseeable environment.75  Ultimately, the 1967 Act legislatively 
enshrines access to an abortion, though it does so in a negative way.  More precisely, it makes 
abortion treatment lawful under certain conditions, and in doing so it brings abortion within the 
highly structured system of the NHS, involving hospitals, health teams, and accountability.76  In other 
words, the UK acted early to recognise the importance of abortion and to establish access, though its 
approach is not entirely inspired nor particularly inspiring. 
 
B. A Built-in Limitation: Conscientious Objection 
 
Of course, the rights on which abortion is grounded are not absolute, and conditions on access to 
abortion might be justified on a number of grounds, the most compelling of which is probably the 
controversial nature of the practice in light of divergent but (arguably) defensible moral positions.  
Another might be resource allocation, though it must be observed that abortions are typically quick 
and inexpensive day-surgeries; certainly less resource-intensive than birth-related services such as 
prenatal care, birthing attendance, neonatal intensive care, etc.77  A further factor which impinges 
on the right to have an abortion, though it is not meant to actually serve as a limitation on access, is 
CO.  As noted, s 4(1) states that no person is under a duty to participate in any treatment authorised 
by the 1967 Act to which he has a CO.78 
The right to CO that is acknowledged in the 1967 Act is notionally founded on Article 18 
UDHR, which is reproduced in Article 18(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(1966) (ICCPR),79 which states: 
 
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This 
right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and 
freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to 
manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. 
 
                                                          
75  Subsection 1(2), 1967 Act.  In other words, the ‘committee’ can take into account the pregnant 
woman’s family, broader social and economic situation, and any other relevant factors.  Again, this 
requirement for multi-physician sanction was found to be unconstitutional in Morgentaler.  And one can 
question why a woman’s right of access to a treatment as fundamental to reproductive choice as abortion 
should be subject to such review, or even to referral (as opposed to available through direct self-
appointment). 
76  1967 Act, s 1(3), and so noted in Doogan, at para. 27, though Lady Hale subsequently and curiously 
denied that Parliament could have had in its contemplation the members of that team when legislating on CO. 
77  J Erdman, ‘In the Back Alleys of Health Care: Abortion, Equality and Community in Canada’ (2007) 56 
Emory LJ 1093-1155. 
78  The only other explicit reference to CO in British medical law can be found in s 38 of the Human 
Fertility and Embryology Act 1990, as amended.  However, CO is an entitlement that is also extended to 
practitioners through guidance issued by various professional bodies (see infra). 
79  UNGA Res 2200A (XXI), 16 December 1966, in force 23 March 1976. 
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This right to freedom of conscience and religion is reflected in Article 9(1) ECHR,80 and is further 
reiterated in Article 9, Schedule 1, of the 1998 Act, and made operational through ss 1, 3 and 13.81   
This foundation for CO has been generally recognised.82 
Of course, after erecting the right to freedom of conscience and religion, Article 18(3) ICCPR 
states that: 
 
Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, 
order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. 
 
Again, this limitation is reflected in Article 9(2) ECHR, and Article 9(2) Schedule 1, of the 1998 Act.  Its 
consequence is that CO must also be viewed as a limited entitlement, particularly in the 
reproductive healthcare setting where, as demonstrated, other fundamental rights are in play, and 
where the consequences of non-vindication for treatment-seeking women are arguably much more 
profound than the consequences to the healthcarers participating against their conscience. 
Of course, in Doogan, the UKSC did not address the broader rights-foundation of CO, and so 
did not offer any insight into its proper balancing as against the right to an abortion from a broader 
conceptual perspective.  This was unfortunate because the failure to preserve legal prohibitions 
against abortion, or alternatively to impose restrictive conditions on access to abortions, has 
prompted anti-choice advocates to employ CO and other tactics to undermine the provision of 
timely and safe abortion services. 
With respect to ‘other tactics’, it has been reported that, in the UK, access to abortion is 
threatened because the number of physicians trained in abortion treatment is falling.83  This 
phenomenon is also discernible in other jurisdictions; in Canada, medical schools are neglecting to 
train physicians in this field,84 while some physicians choose not to study in this specialty because 
they face harassment and violence out in practice.85  While it might be improper to claim that this is 
a conscious programme of marginalisation on the part of medical schools, it is troubling to learn that 
less than an hour is spent teaching abortion in a 4-year curriculum, while magnitudes more time is 
spent discussing Viagra.86  Other actions which undermine access to an abortion include a low and 
falling number of hospitals providing abortion services, management and administration decisions 
which require women to travel to find another provider, which can endanger their confidentiality, 
                                                          
80  Which states: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in 
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.” 
81  Section 1(1) states that ‘Convention rights’ means the rights and freedoms set out in the ECHR, s 1(2) 
states that those rights have effect in the UK, s 3(1) states that, so far as is possible, legislation must be read 
and given effect in a way which is compatible with Convention rights, and s 13 states that, if a court’s 
determination of any question arising under this Act might affect the exercise of the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion, it must have particular regard to the importance of that right. 
82  UNHRC, General Comment No. 22: The Right to Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion, 48th 
Session, 1993, in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights 
Treaty Bodies, vol. I, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev. 9 (2008), at 204; EU Network of Independent Experts on 
Fundamental Rights, Opinion No. 4-2005: The Right to Conscientious Objection and the Conclusion by EU 
Member States of Concordats with the Holy See, 14 December 2005, CFR-CDF.Opinion 4-2005.doc. 
83  J Roe, C Francombe and M Bush, ‘Recruitment and Training of British Obstetrician and Gynaecologists 
for Abortion Provision: Conscientious Objection Versus Opting Out’ (1999) 14 Repro Health Matters 97-105; K 
Roslyn, ‘Conscientious Objection to Termination of Pregnancy: The Competing Rights of Patients and Nurses’ 
(2009) 17 J Nursing Management 907-912. 
84  A Koyama and R Williams, ‘Abortion in Medical School Curricula’ (2005) 8 McGill J Medicine 157-160. 
85  L Eggerton, ‘Abortion Services in Canada: A Patchwork Quilt with Many Holes’ (2001) 164 CMAJ 847-
849. 
86  C Kaposy, ‘Improving Abortion Access in Canada’ (2010) 18 Health Care Anal 17-34. 
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their wellbeing, or their life.87 
With respect to CO more specifically, McHale has noted a slow growth of ‘opt-out’ across 
healthcare provision,88 a finding in keeping with Cantor’s warning about ‘conscience creep’ in the 
USA.89  It has been reported that some 20% of British GPs are against abortion on the basis of their 
religious beliefs, and that some of them actively work to delay or prevent women from securing 
abortion services.90  In at least one case, this has led to a claim of medical negligence against the 
physician.91  It has also been reported that these GPs routinely impose their views about morality 
and conscientiousness on young women, who are one of the most vulnerable groups in this setting 
(at risk in no small part because they tend to be less aware of their rights).92  And there have been 
efforts to expand the use of CO to more healthcarers and to more peripheral elements of abortion 
treatment, a case in point being Doogan, where the midwives objected to delegating, supervising 
and/or supporting staff to participate in, and provide care to, patients throughout the termination 
process. 
Of course, the undermining of access to abortion and the misuse of CO is not just a UK 
problem.  It is a global problem that is driven at least in part by conservative religious institutions 
intent on undermining women’s reproductive rights.93  The uneven enjoyment of adequate 
reproductive healthcare across Europe has long been recognised,94 and a range of bodies tasked 
with monitoring human rights and women’s health have repeatedly cited countries for their failure 
to comply with their obligations.  For example, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW), which monitors compliance with the Women’s Convention, has issued 
reports against Italy,95 Croatia,96 Poland,97 and Slovakia.98  Further examples include the following: 
 
 Norway: CO was available to physicians, nurses and midwives, but it came to light that a 
growing number of GPs were refusing to refer patients to non-objectors.  This led to a 2011 
Regulation which banned CO.99 
                                                          
87  J Shaw, Reality Check: A Close Look at Accessing Abortion Services in Canadian Hospitals (Canadians 
for Choice, 2005). 
88  J McHale, ‘Conscientious Objection and the Nurse: A Right or a Privilege?’ (2009) 18 Br J Nursing 1262-
1263. 
89  J Cantor, ‘Conscientious Objection Gone Awry: Restoring Selfless Professionalism in Medicine’ (2009) 
360 N Engl J Med 1484-1485. 
90  E Lee, S Clements, et al., A Matter of Choice (J Rowntree Foundation, 2004). 
91  In Enright v Kwun [2003] EWHC 1000 (QB), the Court found a physician negligent for failing to counsel 
a patient on genetic screening, a failure that was, on the evidence, partially caused by his religious beliefs. 
92  J Coleman, ‘Meeting the Health Needs of Young People’ (2001) 55 J Epidemiology & Comm Health 
532-533. 
93  L Finer and J Fine, ‘Abortion Law around the World: Progress and Pushback’ (2012) 103 Am J Public 
Health 585-589.  For a report on the Philippines: C Ruiz Austria, ‘The Church, the State and Women’s Bodies in 
the Context of Religious Fundamentalism in the Philippines’ (2004) 12 Reproductive Health Matters 96-103.  
For a report on the plight of women in Latin America: R Cook, M Olaya, B Dickens, ‘Healthcare Responsibilities 
and Conscientious Objection’ (2009) 104 Int J Gynecology & Obstetrics 249-252.  For the situation in parts of 
Africa: L-J Van Bogaert, ‘The Limits of Conscientious Objection to Abortion in the Developing World’ (2002) 2 
Developing World Bioethics 131-143; V Lema, ‘Conscientious Objection and Reproductive Health Service 
Delivery in Sub-Saharan Africa’ (2012) 16 Afr J Reproductive Health 15-21. 
94  European Parliament, Resolution on Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights, PA 2001/2128(INI) 
(2002). 
95  CEDAW, Concluding Observations: Italy, UN Doc. A/52/38 Rev. 1 (1997). 
96  CEDAW, Concluding Observations: Croatia, UN Doc. A/53/38 (1998). 
97  CEDAW, Concluding Observations: Poland, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/POL/CO/6 (2007). 
98  CEDAW, Concluding Observations: Slovakia, UN Doc. A/63/38 (2008). 
99  E Kibsgaard Nordberg, H Skirbekk, M Magelssen, ‘Conscientious objection to referrals for abortion: 
pragmatic solution of threat to women’s rights?’ (2014) 15 BMC Medical Ethics 1-9. 
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 France: In Pichon & Sajous v France,100 two pharmacists were convicted when they refused 
to serve female customers.  They claimed that their freedom to manifest their religion under 
the ECHR had been violated as a result of their conviction, but the ECtHR concluded that 
their refusal to sell contraceptives did not fall within the scope of the right to manifest a 
religious belief.  It also emphasised that the pharmacists could not give priority to their 
personal beliefs over their professional obligations where the sale of such medicine was 
legal and could only occur by prescription at a pharmacy.101 
 
 Poland: In RR v Poland,102 a woman was denied a prenatal genetic examination in part as a 
result of the physician’s conscientious objection.  The ECtHR observed that her access to 
care was marred by procrastination and confusion, and that she was treated shabbily, 
resulting in acute anguish.  It concluded that States are obliged to organise healthcare 
systems so that freedom of conscience does not prevent patients from securing services.  In 
P and S v Poland,103 the ECtHR reiterated that physician rights to object must be balanced 
with patient rights to access abortion.  In fact, both the UN Human Rights Committee, which 
monitors compliance with the ICCPR, and the UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, which monitors compliance with the ICESCR, have expressed concern about 
Poland’s measures to achieve quality, affordable reproductive health services.104 
 
 Canada: It has been reported that anti-choice GPs have refused to provide referrals for 
abortions, and indeed have been known to give women misinformation about eligibility and 
timing, sometimes stalling in the provision of information until after the statutory 
gestational limits are passed.105 
 
 USA: The misuse of CO is particularly acute.106  State Legislatures have drafted statutory 
provisions permitting hospital administrators, ambulance attendants, and others to object 
on the basis of religion.  For example, the Mississippi Health Care Rights of Conscience Act 
2004 opens the possibility of objecting to providers of any phase of patient care, including 
but not limited to referral, counselling, therapy, testing, diagnosis, research, instruction, 
prescribing, dispensing or administering devices, drugs or medication, surgery, or any other 
care.107  Anti-choice advocates have since drafted a similar model statute and associated 
policy guidance for use in political lobbying and legal actions against abortion.108  Also note 
the US foreign aid policy which restricts overseas NGOs that receive US aid from using any 
money (including their own private funds) to provide abortion services, to advocate for a 
                                                          
100  [2001] ECHR 898 (ECtHR). 
101  B Knestout, ‘An Essential Prescription: Why Pharmacist-Inclusive Conscience Clauses are Necessary’ 
(2006) 22 J Contemp Health Law & Policy 349-382; L Davidson, C Pettis, et al., ‘Religion and Conscientious 
Objection: A Survey of Pharmacists’ Willingness to Dispense Medications’ (2010) 71 Soci Sci Med 161-165. 
102  (2011) 53 EHRR 31 (ECtHR). 
103  [2012] ECHR 1853. 
104  UNHRC, Concluding Observations: Poland, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/82/POL (2004); CESCR, Concluding 
Observations: Poland, UN Doc. EC12/POL/CO/5 (2009); UNHRC, Concluding Observations: Poland, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/POL/CO/6 (2010). 
105  Canadian Abortion Rights Action League, Protecting Abortion Rights in Canada (CARAL, 2003); J 
Hawkins and E Emauel, ‘Clarifying Confusions about Coercion’ (2005) 35 Hasting Centre Rep 16-19. 
106  Cantor, note 89. 
107  B Dickens, ‘Ethical Misconduct by Abuse of Conscientious Objection Laws’ (2006) 25 Medicine & Law 
513-522. 
108  Americans United for Life, Healthcare Freedom of Conscience Act: Model Legislation and Policy Guide 
(2013). 
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liberalisation of their own abortion laws, or to offer full and accurate abortion information 
to patients.109 
 
All told, the politico-legal environment routinely inhibits women from exercising their autonomy and 
determining their own course of medical treatment, and the exercise of CO has compounded this 
problem.110  This interference with their ability to set their own conditions of existence, it has been 
argued, represents an unjust state of ‘domination’ which should not be tolerated.111 
Because CO has been inordinately directed at interventions in women’s health, CEDAW 
issued General Recommendation No. 24.112  Paragraph 6 states that special attention should be given 
to the health needs and rights of women belonging to vulnerable and disadvantaged groups.  
Paragraph 11 adds that: 
 
… It is discriminatory for a State party to refuse to provide legally for the 
performance of certain reproductive health services for women.  For instance, if 
health service providers refuse to perform such services based on conscientious 
objection, measures should be introduced to ensure that women are referred to 
alternative health providers. 
 
This makes clear that governments bear responsibilities to introduce measures to ensure that 
women can access care that some healthcarers may object to providing.113  It reaffirms that, 
although CO is a right, it must be tempered by other rights (and historical wrongs).  It also suggests 
that healthcarers are moral as well as public agents, and so their professionalism is relevant to the 
operation of this setting.  As such, it is critical to consider the obligations of healthcarers when it 
comes to treatment provision and CO; such will permit a deeper appreciation of the role and 
position of CO within the caring profession, and a better articulation of how it might be managed by 
health authorities tasked with actioning governmental responsibilities and policies. 
 
C. The Professional Healthcarer and CO 
 
It is important to first recognise that physicians must be both scientifically and ethically grounded 
(and educated) in order to perform their functions, which are undeniably public functions.114  In 
other words, conscience and conscientiousness runs through all of their professional duties and 
judgments, and those duties include forming both ethically and scientifically sound clinical 
judgments, and thereby serving as (moral and trustworthy) gatekeepers to the NHS’s healthcare 
services.  Indeed, Montgomery argues that cases such as Re J,115 R (Burke) v GMC,116 AVS (by his 
                                                          
109  US Agency for International Development, Standard Provisions for US Grantees and US Subgrantees 
(1985) 13 AID Handbook 4C-45-50, a policy introduced under the Reagan administration in 1984 and now 
known as the Global Gag Rule. 
110  And it is difficult to ascertain if the invocation of CO is due to an honest and deeply-held moral or 
religious belief, or rather to an ideological position intended to thwart women’s access to lawful reproductive 
treatments.  Note that the 1967 Act explicitly instructs healthcarers to act in good faith. 
111  M Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (NJ: Princeton U Press, 1990). 
112  CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 24: Article 12 of the Convention (Women and Health), 20th 
Session, 1999, in UN Document A/54/38/Rev.1, chap. I. 
113  This point is emphasised in Guidelines 1, 2 and 6 of International Federation of Gynaecology and 
Obstetrics, Ethical Issues in Obstetrics and Gynaecology: Ethical Guidelines on Conscientious Objection (2012), 
which affirms that a physician’s primary conscientious duty is to provide benefit and avoid harm to the patient, 
that healthcarers should not impose their values onto others, and that they may have to undertake treatment 
to which they object. 
114  Montgomery, note 23. 
115  [1991] 3 All ER 930 (CA). 
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litigation friend CS) v An NHS Foundation Trust,117 Aintree NHS Trust v James,118 and others, 
demonstrate both the integration of conscientiousness in health professionalism and the belief that 
the exercise of professional judgment is informed by moral considerations (i.e., that healthcare is a 
‘morally suffused activity’).119  That being so, healthcarers must be viewed as moral agents who are 
particularly sensitised to morality, or rather to ethically balanced assessments. 
The morality or conscientiousness to which healthcarers must conform is informed at least 
in part by general and long-standing notions of medical ethics.  The concept of ‘medical etiquette’ 
first appeared in Greece around 500 BCE and eventually coalesced into the Hippocratic Oath, which 
clearly states that a physician is there for the benefit of his patients, and must, to the best of her 
ability, do good, and additionally do nothing that will cause harm (thereby foreshadowing the 
contemporary principles of beneficence and non-maleficence).120  Under the modern version of the 
Hippocratic Oath, which has global reach, physicians declare the following:121 
 
I will apply, for the benefit of the sick, all measures which are required, avoiding 
those twin traps of overtreatment and therapeutic nihilism. 
 
I will remember that I remain a member of society, with special obligations to all my 
fellow human beings, those sound of mind and body as well as the infirm. 
 
The World Medical Association (WMA) has issued a Code which states that physicians shall maintain 
the highest standards of professional conduct, respect a competent patient’s right to accept or 
refuse treatment, not allow his judgment to be influenced by personal profit or unfair 
discrimination, provide competent medical service in full professional and moral independence, with 
compassion and respect for human dignity, deal honestly with patients, and respect the rights and 
preferences of patients.122 
The following examples go some way to demonstrating the moral/ethical character of the 
healthcare professions and how conscientiousness is intended to inform their day-to-day 
professional activities.  The General Medical Council (GMC), which sets standards for students and 
physicians, instructs its members to, inter alia:123 
 
 make the care of their patient their first concern; 
 protect and promote the health of patients and the public; 
 treat patients as individuals and respect their dignity, working with them, and responding to 
their concerns and preferences; 
 give patients the information they want or need in a way they can understand so they can 
realise their right to reach decisions about their treatment; and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
116  [2005] EWCA Civ. 1003. 
117  [2011] EWCA Civ. 7. 
118  [2013] UKSC 67. 
119  Montgomery, note 23, at 205-206.  See also E Pelligrino, ‘Toward a Reconstruction of Medical 
Morality’ (2006) 6 Am J Bioethics 65-71; C Foster and J Miola, ‘Who’s in Charge? The Relationship Between 
Medical Law, Medical Ethics, and Medical Morality?’ (2015) 23 Med Law Rev 505-530. 
120  G Laurie, S Harmon, G Porter, Mason & McCall Smith’s Law & Medical Ethics, 10th ed. (OUP, 2016), 
ch. 1. 
121  Hippocratic Oath, Modern Version, written by Dean of Medicine Louis Lasagna, Tufts University, in 
1964 and used in many medical schools.  Available at 
http://guides.library.jhu.edu/c.php?g=202502&p=1335759 [accessed 30 April 2016]. 
122  WMA, International Code of Medical Ethics, revised at 57th WMA General Assembly, Pilanesberg, 
South Africa, October 2006, available at http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/c8/index.html 
[accessed 30 April 2016]. 
123  GMC, Good Medical Practice (2013). 
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 never discriminate unfairly against patients or colleagues, or abuse their trust. 
 
The International Council of Midwifery (ICM) recognises that pregnancy is a profound experience 
which carries significant meaning for the woman, and it articulates its philosophy in the following 
propositions:124 
 
 Midwifery care promotes, protects and supports women’s human, reproductive and sexual 
health and rights, and is based on the ethical principles of justice, equity, and respect for 
human dignity. 
 
 Midwifery care is emancipatory as it protects and enhances the health and social status of 
women, and builds women's self confidence in their ability to cope with childbirth. 
 
 Midwifery care takes place in partnership with women, recognising the right to self-
determination, and is respectful, personalised, continuous and non-authoritarian. 
 
The Royal College of Nursing (RCN), which oversees nurses and works in cooperation with the 
Nursing and Midwifery Council, instructs nurses and staff to treat patients with dignity and 
humanity, showing compassion and sensitivity, to engage and communicate with patients and put 
them first, and to lead by example.125  A similar collection of virtue-grounded professional duties are 
espoused by other important professional bodies around the world.126  Compliance with these duties 
has contributed to healthcarers constructing, by-and-large, a series of competent, public-serving 
professions the most virtuous members of which have placed patients above themselves and 
modelled high degrees of self-sacrifice.127 
Subsection 4(1) of the 1967 Act relieves physicians (and other healthcarers) from having to 
justify their decision according to the above professional standards and values; it allows them to 
impose their personal sensibilities unclothed by clinical judgment or jargon (i.e., to expose and 
impose their personal values and views in the clinical setting in which they have professional and 
statutory obligations to serve steadfastly and without discrimination).  In short, it allows them to 
retreat in some way from the value of beneficence, which is meant to shape their interactions with 
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patients.  Because s 4(1) allows the exercise of personal rather than professional conscience, 
Montgomery claims as follows: 
 
… [CO] as set out in s 4 of the Abortion Act 1967 needs to be understood as an act 
of heresy, a departure from the orthodox professional identity.  It therefore needs 
to be justified by reference to the possibility of accommodating heterodox positions 
without undermining the identity of the profession.128 
 
He goes on to argue that enabling professionals to shape the scope of access to abortion on personal 
moral grounds is unacceptable, in part because limiting that access undermines the public 
conscience of the professional as expressed in the various guiding instruments.129 
With respect to exercising CO (and so departing from professional identity), the British 
Medical Association (BMA), a union which represents over 170,000 physicians, states that physicians 
should have a right to CO to participation in certain treatments, including abortion, but should not 
allow their religious or cultural beliefs to impact negatively on the doctor-patient relationship.130  
However, it notes that this right is not absolute and must not impact on the patient’s right to care, 
and it cautions against discriminatory practices.131  The GMC and the General Pharmaceutical Council 
(GPC) also allow CO, though both indicate that their members must inform employers, partners, 
colleagues, and relevant authorities about their views so that patient care is not compromised.132  
The Royal College of General Practitioners (RCGP) allows for wide-ranging opt-outs,133 and it has 
been argued that there now exists a lack of clarity about which treatments healthcarers may validly 
opt out of using CO.134 
The above suggests that healthcarers are expected to be reasonable and circumspect in their 
approach to Col too ready a reliance on it would undermine the values and standards which they are 
expected, as a self-regulating public-serving profession, to meet.  Recognition of such would have 
been useful in Doogan; the UKSC might have stipulated that, while religious belief may well be a 
private matter, the exercise of CO in healthcare is not; it is a professional privilege that impacts on 
the timely availability of lawful treatments, and so its exercise is of great concern to the public.135  It 
might have added that its invocation might therefore be limited to quite narrow circumstances, for 
healthcarers surely know (and accept) that they have an ethical duty to provide treatment that may 
not sit well with them (i.e., their sensibilities are often and rightly secondary to the needs of their 
patients).136  Here, one might recall the admonition of Pope John Paul II: 
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… [F]reedom of conscience does not confer a right to indiscriminate recourse to 
conscientious objection.  When an asserted freedom turns into a licence or 
becomes an excuse for limiting the rights of others, the State is obliged to protect, 
also by legal means, the inalienable rights of its citizens against such abuses.137 
 
Ultimately, as a matter of professionalism, it is essential to ensure that CO does not become a 
barrier to accessing safe and effective reproductive health counselling, treatment (including 
abortion), and aftercare. 
 
V. Treatment and Objection: A Proper Balance 
 
The above offered a rights-foundation for abortion and for CO, and a contextualising view of the 
healthcare profession, all of which supports a relatively limited availability of CO in the abortion (and 
other healthcare) context.138  Had UKSC considered this foundation when interpreting the scope of s 
4(1), it might have found as follows: 
 
 By operation of the 1967 Act, abortion has been brought into the NHS system, which relies 
on healthcare teams providing treatment which is often (and in this case) viewed as a 
process involving a range of medical and non-medical actions and staff. 
 
 CO is justifiably available to any of those individuals, but, bearing in mind the competing 
rights and the professional duties and identity implicated, the conditions for exercising CO 
are strict and the availability of its invocation is narrow. 
 
The UKSC might then have articulated those conditions with respect to the 1967 Act and beyond, 
and offered some insight into the range of measures that might be adopted (by health authorities) 
to ensure timely access to abortion treatment and the appropriate exercise of CO (so that all UK 
stakeholders might be unquestionably aware of their responsibilities when it comes to abortion 
services and the scope of CO in relation thereto).  The measures that might be adopted to ensure 
access to abortion and justifiable use of CO implicate training, healthcare administration, and 
personal action. 
With respect to training and administration, the government and health authorities might 
have been encouraged to scrutinise and work with medical and healthcare educators to ensure that 
they are training sufficient numbers of healthcarers to provide quality reproduction services.  
Related to this, medical schools, health authorities and hospital administrators might have been 
reminded that they need to ensure that NHS and hospital management policies are such that 
sufficient numbers of healthcarers trained and prepared to undertake a full range of care, including 
abortions, are on staff.139  They must also ensure that a sufficient number and spread of hospitals 
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with quality abortion services exists, and that clinics are appropriately folded into the healthcare 
architecture.  Related to this, it might have been strongly emphasised that institutions cannot invoke 
CO, and must not contractually limit their employees from participating in reproductive healthcare, 
including abortion. 
With respect to training and personal action, the UKSC might have noted that medical 
schools and health authorities need to ensure that medical and healthcare education equips 
practitioners to comprehend the basis of the abortion debate from multiple perspectives (i.e., their 
profession, society, and individual women affected).140  This will not only allow healthcarers to think 
proactively about their own values and duties, but also to fashion comprehensible COs when they 
have them and to evaluate COs that have been made.  With respect to shaping personal action, the 
UKSC might have encouraged health authorities to ensure that clear policies and mechanisms for the 
exercise of CO are in place.141  Fovargue and Neal offer a defensible list:142 
 
1. A CO can be invoked in response only to those treatments whose status as ‘proper medical 
treatment’ is contested or liminal.143 
 
2. When invoked, CO must meet certain criteria to wit the position held must be: 
a. sincere; 
b. tolerable and respectful of the conscientious conclusions of others; 
c. capable of articulation and externalisation; and 
d. fundamental such that its violation poses a serious risk to one’s moral integrity. 
 
3. As a condition of exercise, CO must be contingent upon satisfying duties to: 
a. behave respectfully, sensitively, empathically, and non-confrontationally to the 
(possibly vulnerable) patient;144 
b. avoid imposing unnecessary or unreasonable burdens on patients and colleagues; 
c. act despite one’s CO in emergency situations; 
d. account if called upon to do so; and 
e. immediately refer the patient to another physician within the institution or as close 
as possible so that the treatment can be obtained.145 
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A few words on criterion 2.c. and duty 3.d. is warranted.  The criterion suggests a need for objector 
to articulate and make public (at least to some extent) the CO.  While the details would certainly be 
left to the employer, it has been argued that COs should be made in writing, which form must 
advance a sensible position rationally connected to one’s moral integrity, and which form must 
additionally be reviewed.146  Given the ideological positions that have occupied abortion politics, 
some form of review seems appropriate. 
On the matter of criteria and duties, the UKSC might have profitably noticed a number of 
significant authorities and precedents.  For example, the WHO has stated the following: 
 
Health-carers who [CO] must refer the woman to another willing and trained 
provider in the same, or another easily accessible healthcare facility.  Where 
referral is not possible, the health-care professional who objects must provide 
abortion to save the woman’s life or to prevent damage to her health.  Health 
services should be organised in such a way as to ensure that an effective exercise of 
the freedom of conscience … does not prevent patients from obtaining access to 
services to which they are entitled.147 
 
From a jurisprudential perspective, Decision T-388/2009 of the Colombian Constitutional Court is on 
point.148  In that case a 13 year-old girl was raped, became pregnant, and sought an abortion 
pursuant to the requirements set out in Decision C-355/2006.149  However, she was bounced around 
between several health facilities, who gave her bad information, and she was, in the end, forced to 
give birth.  In a much more engaged and satisfying decision, the Court firmly and usefully grounded 
its judgment on the fact that Colombia – like the UK – is a participatory and pluralistic democracy 
that must respect human dignity.150  Thus, while the exercise of a liberty such as CO is warranted, it 
must not, even inadvertently, result in an arbitrary or disproportionate interference with the rights 
of others.151  The Court stated that limitations on CO are justified when it is raised in the context of 
legitimate and lawful procedures, and it went on to stipulate as follows: 
 
 CO can only be exercised by an individual with direct participation in the procedure (e.g., 
surgical nurses, surgeons, anaesthetists, not admitting staff, post-operative nurses, office 
personnel, ambulance attendants, dispensing pharmacists, etc.).152 
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 The healthcarer must state his objection in writing, indicating reasons, and with reference to 
the facts of the case, but without general language offered by other institutions such as 
religious authorities, and objections must be reviewed by another medical professional or 
government committee (to test for religious or moral foundation, consistency, etc.).153 
 
 The healthcarer must refer the patient to a willing colleague, and hospitals can recover 
liability costs from physicians who fail to meet their obligations to refer.154 
 
 The healthcare service must ensure the presence of a sufficient number of healthcarers to 
protect the rights of women to medically indicated abortions.155 
 
 Institutions such as health facilities cannot exercise the right of CO because they are not 
natural persons with a conscience or soul, nor can institutions enter into agreements to 
refuse to provide abortions, nor direct their physicians to refuse to perform abortions.156 
 
Obviously, the UKSC cannot impose all of the above obligations on all of the relevant actors (in all of 
the potential CO scenarios) in the context of a single case.  But highlighting them in Doogan would 
have been salutary; it would have brought the significance of the precedent more in line with the 
more comprehensive and socially situated Decision T-388/2009, which is much celebrated,157 and it 
would have made the decision more relevant beyond the facts of this case, an outcome to which the 
UKSC should aspire. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
Access to safe and legal abortion, where it has been achieved, is under threat, not least from 
healthcarers who would decline to advise patients about, or to perform, abortions based on their 
religious or ideological beliefs.  Given the growing prevalence of questionable deployments of CO, a 
robust discussion of its foundation and limits is warranted so that it is clear to all interested parties 
that the right of CO is grounded in the human right of freedom of conscience and religion, that its 
use by healthcarers is justified, but that the right of CO is subject to limits, and that the restrictions 
on its use are properly broad and strictly enforced in the abortion context because of what is at 
stake, namely the physical and emotional wellbeing of women (and families) and their right, long 
undermined, to dignity and autonomy in reproductive health.  Other supreme courts have offered 
much more holistic examinations of CO and its proper limits, and so have better reminded 
healthcarers and other public officials that they must respect the conscience of the women to whom 
they owe duties of care.  Doogan could and should have been an equally holistic examination, 
affirming the obligation to use CO sparingly, and with clear and rational justifications and supported 
by acceptably moral behaviour, but it was not.  The UKSC’s failure to grasp the nettle of CO in its 
broader context must be seen as a lost opportunity to provide much-needed clarity in the care-
giving landscape.  Perhaps next time. 
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